



# PEGIDA – PERMANENT PROTEST AND LACK OF REPRESENTATION?

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


# Preliminary Remarks

- One year of weekly protests = took its toll on the political climate in Dresden publicly and privately (highly partisan discourse)
- Confrontations on the streets and at the kitchen table
- PEGIDA, "Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West"

**BUT: If one can detach oneself (not easy) and become an observer, PEGIDA offers rare chances to research motivation, gestalt, and change of a protest movement over longer periods of time**





# What do we know?

- Four surveys
  - Only partially comparable but nevertheless useful in a complementary fashion = similar findings in all surveys

	Sample	Methods	Interviewer	Interviews /handout	Response rate	Date
<b>Patzelt</b>	Quota	Face to face	15/71/37	242 (492) /271 (568) /434 (1124)	49%/ 48%/ 39%	01.25.15 04.27.15 05.04.15
<b>Vorländer et al.</b>	Random	Face to face	15	400 (1142)	35%	01.12.15 (12.22.14/ 01.05.15)
<b>Walter et al.</b>	Random	Online/focus groups/observation		547 (3500?)	15% (21%/37%)	01.12.15
<b>Rucht et al.</b>	Random	Online/observation		123 (670)	7%(18%)	01.12.15

# Socio-economic Background

- On average, protesters exhibit the following characteristics
- Mostly male (77%), 49 years old
- Unaffiliated with any religion (78%), married (53%), based in Dresden (61%) or the vicinity of Dresden (24%)
- Received professional or vocational education (24% degree of higher education)
- working (67%) or retired (23%)
- wages below average (2800 €, 52%/26%)

... protesters are **certainly not part of any “precarious lower class”**

# Socio-economic Background

	Vorländer et al.	Walter et al.	Rucht et al.
Age (years)	48	>56 (18,2%) <35 (27,1%)	40,5
Sex (♂)	75%	81,5%	76%
Higher Education	28%	39,8%	35%
Residence	Metro-area: 36% Saxony: 38% East Germany: 9%	Dresden: 37,8% Vicinity: 31,4% Saxony: 17,6%	Dresden: 44,2% Vicinity: 41,7% East Germany: 9,8%

... protesters are **certainly not part of any “precarious lower class”**

# Three identifiable groups of demonstrators

## 1 Patriotic/xenophobic (53%)

- To the right of center
- Self-identified patriots
- Meritocratic view on politics and society (influence through achievement)
- Feel a strong disconnect between parties/politicians and themselves (lack of representation)
- Participate frequently in PEGIDA-Demonstrations
- See their movement as having positive effects on Germany as a whole
- Cannot find common ground with opponents of PEGIDA
- Demand numbers of foreigners to be reduced, especially numbers of asylum seekers
- Strongly doubt that a peaceful Islam or peaceful Muslims can blend into the German society

## **2. Conditionally xenophile (30%)**

- Believe that Germany should continue to grant asylum to refugees from civil war and politically persecuted persons
- Closer to the political center
- Open to the idea of a peaceful Islam and peaceful Muslims
- Strongly disagree with the media coverage of PEGIDA
- Doubt that discussions of on PEGIDA's FB-page is balanced and fair

## **3. Right-wing xenophobes (17%)**

- Do not reject the use of violence against political opponents
- Younger and farther to the right
- Want to reduce the number of foreigners in Germany, without distinguishing between asylum and other modes of migration




# Representation gap?


- Werner J. Patzelt
  - Neglect of voters
  - Positions right of center lack representation
  - Result of a decade-long process
  - PEGIDA representing underlying pattern of neglect on a national scale
- At the core of PEGIDA
  - disdain for parties and elites, not Islam




# SELF-EVALUATION LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION




# TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES




# "WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR IF FEDERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD THIS SUNDAY?"



# "I FEEL REPRESENTED BY OUR PARTIES AND POLITICIANS!"




# „IS DEMOCRACY, ON THE WHOLE, RATHER BENEFICIAL OR PROBLEMATIC?“



# „HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS BEING APPLIED IN GERMANY?“

January (Walter et al.): n = 530; April: n = 267; mean: 2,8; May: n = 428; mean: 2,7



# Why do parties fail to provide a viable option for protesters discontent?

- Overall devastatingly low trust in state institutions, esp. parties, (Rucht et al.)
  - BUT: police, courts, NGOs most trusted
- Maybe because of discontent with the party-system itself?
  - Rooted in perception of democracy, etc.?
- Or rather a lack of representation?

**PEGIDA as a sign of national unrest or confined to local/regional sphere?**



# Why Dresden?


- Dresden as a stage (Rehberg)
  - High culture, old town = backdrop for (inter-)national attention (Walter et al.)
  - e.g. annually commemoration protests
- Protesters from the vicinity/hinterland
  - Only a minority from Dresden
- Dresden and attitudes towards foreigners (Reuband)
  - Decline in resentments since 1990s, 2014 as low point
  - Not significantly different in comparison with other German cities
- Results of last Saxon state election (2014)
  - Dresden vicinity: nearly 1/5 of all votes to AfD/NPD
- Dresden as proxy for conservative debates (Fischer)
  - Reunification/architectural reconstruction/commemoration

# External causes?

- Contingent causes
  - Group of organizers (peer group/flood/professional background)
  - PKK demonstration
- Counter protests following ingrained patterns
  - Blockades and attribution of political labels (“Nazi”, “Facist”, etc.)


In sum: phenomenon rooted in developments since 1989 that have been handled clumsy by national **politicians** and **journalists** and were countered on a local level in a “traditional” way (wrong medicine)

# "THE REPORTING ON PEGIDA IS FAIR AND BALANCED"




# PEGIDA as the seamy underbelly of civil society?


- Self-positioning within historical continuity
  - 70% claim to have participated in 89 (peaceful revolution)
  - back to 1848
  - Equation of reunification and multiculturalism
    - 2nd experiment
- East-German civil society magnified
  - Little experience, state-centered
  - Election - Petition ("Eingabe") – Protest
- Multiculturalism and the current crisis
  - Immediate impact, felt directly on an individual level




# "BACHMANN AND THE ORGANIZERS DO A GOOD JOB AND FURTHER PEGIDAS POLITICAL AGENDA"



## “WILL PEGIDA BRING ABOUT POSITIVE CHANGE FOR THE WHOLE OF GERMANY?”



# "PEGIDA SHOULD BECOME A PARTY"



# Possibilities and Limitations of Inclusion

- Size of Representation Gap?
  - Hard to tell, BUT: something unhinged!
- 3 Options

## 1. PEGIDA Party

- Fuzzy profile of topics as a prerequisite for PEGIDA
  - Fusing of a wide range of topics requires the organizers to stay in the realm of ambiguousness
  - Different tactics = ambiguity, heavy reliance on references to day to day (or more precisely week to week) events, event management (see background of the organizers)
- Assumption: ritualistic character ≠ party
  - Affirmation world view
  - Interpretations on current events (Paris, Refugee crisis, etc.)
  - Bully pulpit (Bachmann in lieu of the audience) to pressure the elites
  - The sense of community and the ritualistic character will be hard to translate into party politics
    - e.g. "Jeder ist ein Ordner", "Dresden zeigt wies geht"
- "Saxon characteristics" of PEGIDA



# Possibilities and Limitations of Inclusion

## 2. Established Party

- CDU as the obvious candidate
- attitudes and beliefs towards geopolitical issues
  - So far blind spot of research
  - e.g. TTIP, Ukraine
  - Assumption: highly dualistic world view (East-West)
- "Split dilemma"
  - SPD and DIE LINKE
  - How to recuperate lost territory without losing existing one?

## 3. AfD

- Highly likely
- Still, dependent on process of consolidation
- Pressure from the right wing
- External and internal communication = walk on a tight rope
  - "Pinocchio-Pressse"

**Thank you for your Attention**

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**Vielen Dank für Ihre  
Aufmerksamkeit**